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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This brief study addresses four questions and issues posed by both supporters and critics of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
(1) Will NAFTA cost Minnesota jobs?
The response to this question is based on numerous estimates of the employment impacts of
NAFTA in different sectors.  Before looking specifically at Minnesota, four general findings are
worthy of notice.  First, because the U.S. economy is very large in comparison with Mexico's
(with national income roughly 25 times as great), the impact of tariff reductions under NAFTA on
the U.S. will be positive but small relative to Mexico.  A second general finding is that NAFTA
will contribute to a process of North American trade growth that is already underway and to
which the current government of Mexico is committed; to the extent that Mexico grows more
rapidly and dynamically under NAFTA, its role as an importer of U.S. exports, and generator of
future U.S. jobs, will grow accordingly.  Third, NAFTA's impacts on wage levels in Mexico will
be positive, while those in the U.S. are barely (although positively) affected.  A 1992 University of
Michigan study concludes that "the narrowing of the wage gap is not accomplished at the expense
of U.S. workers."  Fourth, the impacts of trade expansion with Mexico will be positively related
to employment growth not only in multinational companies but in smaller U.S. businesses which
have accounted for most job gains since 1988.
In Minnesota, all four trends are at work.  First, the Minnesota economy will be positively
affected, although the employment effects will be small.  Most of the gains will come in
agriculture; in manufacturing and services, gains are likely in nonelectrical machinery and
miscellaneous manufactures.  Total employment generation due to NAFTA itself has been
estimated at between 400 and 3,500 jobs, depending on the study and the methods used with
greater impacts if dynamic and "multiplier" effects are considered.
Second, the impacts of NAFTA on Minnesota will be in addition to those already underway
due to expanding Minnesota-Mexico trade.  In agriculture, the major beneficiaries will be corn,
soybeans and oilseeds such as sunflowers, wheat, pork, poultry and beef, and dairy products such
as cheese and butter.  Even in the sugar industry, it is possible that Mexico will remain a sizeable
net importer.  In manufacturing and services, Minnesota has increased trade with Mexico steadily
since 1987; it now ranks seventh as a foreign destination for Minnesota exports.  Among the
leading export industries are industrial machinery, scientific instruments, and electrical equipment. 
The indirect effects of NAFTA in stimulating dynamic income growth in Mexico are at least as
important as its direct effects in building these markets over time.
Third, wage levels in Minnesota are highly unlikely to show effects from NAFTA; but to
the extent that NAFTA raises wages in Mexico, the incentives of Minnesota firms to move south
will be diminished.
Fourth, employment growth in Minnesota due to NAFTA will occur in firms of all sizes,
including small firms specializing in new environmental technologies important to the changing
Mexican economy, such as wastewater treatment.iv
(2) What impacts will NAFTA have on environmental and labor standards, and on
environmental quality and working conditions on both sides of the border?
This largely depends on how certain "side-agreements," currently under negotiation, are
developed to confront the serious environmental and labor issues that NAFTA poses.  While the
side-agreements will determine the outcome, it is clear that without them, NAFTA will face
significant opposition.  And if NAFTA fails, not only will Minnesota (and Mexico) forego
employment gains, it will be much less likely that Mexico will make progress on environmental
and labor issues.  Most of the criticisms of NAFTA on environmental grounds project that it will
make existing environmental problems worse.  Yet without NAFTA, it is doubtful that these
problems would have received the attention they have, or that Mexico and the U.S. would have
committed themselves to environmental improvements.  In this sense, while NAFTA may lead to
trade patterns with negative environmental effects, it also has created an opportunity to influence
Mexico's environmental policies, and to address these effects more openly than ever before.  And
if it succeeds in generating economic and income growth of the sort projected in Mexico, it can
help create the wherewithal to expand remedial environmental efforts.  
It is noteworthy that one of the sectors in which small Minnesota companies are leading
global competitors is in environmental technologies, such as wastewater treatment.  To the extent
that an environmental side-agreement to NAFTA encourages further diffusion of these
technologies, Minnesota will be a beneficiary.  Ironically, if NAFTA is defeated (on environmental
or other grounds), a major opportunity for environmental improvements may have been lost. 
Environmental opponents of NAFTA, if they persist in urging its defeat rather than marshalling
support for additional safeguards, will thus lose an important lever for change.
Change is clearly necessary.  Existing environmental problems in the border region are
especially grave in the maquiladora industries where both government and industry have made
insufficient investments in water treatment and hazardous waste disposal facilities.  In addition to
concerns of a Mexican pollution haven, other environmental issues have arisen as NAFTA was
negotiated.  These include pesticide residues on imported crops and increased levels of air
pollution and more toxic spills due to higher levels of traffic.  
These issues, together with a desire to promote trade through NAFTA, led the Clinton
administration to trilateral negotiations beginning in March, 1993 on an environmental side-
agreement to the NAFTA text based on a North American Commission on Environment (NACE). 
These negotiations are driven by the following logic.  First, NAFTA as a trade measure could lead
to environmental damages, or at a minimum might aggravate existing environmental conditions,
notably in the maquiladora sector and border region.  Second, remediating these damages requires
some regulating mechanism to enforce environmental safeguards.  Third, since the environmental
problems include not only local but transnational problems, a coordinated trilateral response is
required involving new institutional authority.  In sum, improving environmental safeguards seems
not only compatible with a NAFTA treaty, but probably depends on it.  
On May 4, 1993, a coalition of seven national environmental interest groups announced
provisional support for NAFTA, if a satisfactory environmental side-agreement containing the
NACE could be successfully negotiated.  The group included the World Wildlife Fund, thev
National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund,
the Nature Conservancy, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Natural Resources Defense Council.
Labor standards are the subject of the second "side-agreement" negotiations.  Organized
labor has maintained that NAFTA will create incentives for manufacturing to move where wages
are lower.  Like environmental issues, the labor side-agreement has come to the fore largely
because of the NAFTA discussions.  The results of the University of Michigan study noted above
suggest that rather than creating additional downward pressure on U.S. wages, the primary
impact of NAFTA will be to raise Mexican wages, perhaps by as much as 9 percent, without
lowering those in the U.S.  This will reduce the incentive of U.S. firms to seek lower wage levels
by relocating to Mexico.  A labor side-agreement, like its environmental counterpart, can help to
raise occupational, health and safety standards to U.S. levels, and compel U.S. firms to adopt
similar standards in both countries.  But neither process is likely without the opportunities and
incentives created by NAFTA.
(3) What are the risks of "import surges" under the current agreement, especially for
Minnesota's sugar producers, and can safeguards be developed which continue to protect
the sugar industry?
The third "side-agreement" under discussion revolves around possible increases in imports
from Mexico in commodities currently protected at the border.  The most important in Minnesota
is sugar.  Currently, Mexican sugar consumption outpaces production, ranking among the highest
levels in the world, at 102 pounds per capita.  Population growth and economic recovery have
shifted Mexico from net exporter to major net importer status, with a large share of imports
coming from the U.S. as refined sugar under the U.S. re-export program, which allows U.S.
refiners to import world market sugar and re-export the refined product.  Total U.S. sugar
exports to Mexico (including both beet and cane) were 219 thousand metric tons in 1991, 38
percent of total U.S. exports.  Total U.S. imports from Mexico were 7,800 metric tons, less than
one percent of total U.S. imports of 1.613 million tons, which are restricted under tariff rate
quotas.
The concern of the U.S. sugar industry is that new investment in Mexican sugar production,
together with imports of high-fructose-corn-syrup (HFCS) for use in food processing (especially
soft-drinks), will free up sugar for export to the United States.  It is held that U.S. producers will
be inadequately protected under NAFTA from such import surges if and when Mexico reverts to
net exporter status because of provisions granting market access for sugar to the U.S. after six
years.  These fears are reinforced by excess production of sugar in the U.S. in response to
government subsidies.  In the 1993 crop year, beginning October 1, 1992, sugar beet production
is up 12 percent.  This is the reason that the sugar industry has requested an additional side
agreement to safeguard it from such surges.  While such surges are hypothetically possible, a
study tour conducted by the American Farm Bureau concluded that "Scenarios can be developed
in which Mexico has sizeable exports, but there are equally plausible scenarios that leave Mexico
a major net importer of sugar."  The Minnesota sugarbeet industry is relatively low cost among
U.S. producers and, therefore, gains more or suffers less than other U.S. sugar producers from
changing market conditions.
(4) What if NAFTA fails?vi
Much of the debate over NAFTA focuses on the impacts if it passes (with or without  side-
agreements).  Relatively little attention has been given to the opposite question:  What if NAFTA
fails?  Four possible impacts deserve careful consideration.  First, because the impacts of NAFTA
are proportionately much greater for Mexico than for the U.S. and Minnesota, failure will also
bear much more heavily on the Mexican economy and people.  The consequences of failure will
be counterproductive not only for economic growth and development in Mexico, but in Latin
America generally.  Latin America is one of the fastest growing markets for U.S. exports. 
Together, U.S. exports to Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela grew by an average of 49
percent between 1985 and 1988.  Defeating NAFTA would discourage this process of expansion,
lowering standards of living in Latin America and dampening exports to one of the most
promising markets for U.S. exporters in the world.  
Second, these job and income losses will contribute to greater political and economic
instability in Mexico and Latin America, which will in turn provoke additional illegal migration of
Mexican and Latin workers to U.S. markets.  Half of the population of Mexico is 20 years of age
or younger.
Third, NAFTA failure will almost certainly end U.S. interest in environmental problems in
Mexico; even if an interest persists, both the leverage and the wherewithal to confront these
problems will have been lost.  NAFTA has been a key in motivating the Mexican government to
upgrade its environmental standards; the North American Commission on the Environment
(NACE) is one of the most exciting transnational efforts to deal with environmental problems in
history.  NAFTA's defeat will probably spell the end of such efforts.
Fourth, labor standards are unlikely to be addressed either; since wages in Mexico will
remain depressed, the incentive to move factories south to Mexico will continue and could even
accelerate, since the narrowing of the wage gap predicted under NAFTA will not occur.
Given these consequences of failure, the package of the NAFTA already concluded and the
side-agreements being negotiated are more attractive than the alternative of a failed agreement.     
1T. J. Kehoe.  "Assessing the Economic Impact of North American Free Trade."  University of
Minnesota.  Department of Economics.  May, 1992.
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THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA):
ISSUES AND IMPACTS FOR MINNESOTA
C. Ford Runge
INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents a major attempt to ratify
and encourage a process of economic integration between the economies of Canada, the United
States and Mexico.  NAFTA builds upon the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement of January 1, 1989,
when a plan for tariff elimination over 10 years began.  Under NAFTA, tariffs will be eliminated
on commodities traded between the U.S. and Mexico, or phased out over 5, 10 or 15 years. 
When weighted by value imported, 1991 Mexican tariffs on U.S. imports averaged 11 percent,
while U.S. tariffs on Mexican imports averaged 4 percent.
1  Hence, Mexico will open its economy
to the U.S. more than vice-versa.
Negotiations between the Bush Administration and the Mexican and Canadian governments
were completed August 12, 1992, and signed on December 17, 1992.  Under U.S. law, final "fast
track" approval of the text requires that 90 calendar days be set aside for Congressional
consideration, followed by an additional 90 days while Congress is in session for debate over
implementing legislation before a final up-or-down vote.  There is now the likelihood that
additional "side-agreements" will be added to the text, so that the process will not come to a vote
before late 1993 or early 1994.
If approved, NAFTA will create a market of over 360 million people with a total GNP of
nearly 7 trillion U.S. dollars.  The larger process of economic integration between Canada, the
U.S. and Mexico which NAFTA acknowledges has been underway for many years.  However,
recent developments have accelerated economic integration in all parts of the world, especially in
North America and in Europe.  This process would continue without agreements such as NAFTA. 
However, such agreements can help to bolster the ability of North American firms to compete
globally, especially with the European Community, Japan, and other emerging trading blocs. 
Such agreements provide rules which make the transition smoother, and help the parties to
commit themselves to continue opening markets while protecting against adverse developments
for the natural environment, labor standards, or sudden shifts in patterns of trade.2
This study focuses on the particular impacts of NAFTA on the State of Minnesota and its
people.  It draws on available academic and policy research to respond to several key questions
and issues posed by both supporters and critics.  The first of these is:  Will NAFTA cost
Minnesota jobs?  The response to this question is based on numerous estimates of the
employment impacts of NAFTA in different sectors.  These sectors are divided into two
categories:  (1) agriculture and (2) manufacturing and services.  The overall employment effects
of NAFTA on these Minnesota sectors in the future will be modestly positive, especially in
agriculture, and may be even more positive as Mexico's economy grows, importing additional
goods and services from the upper Midwest.
The second issue addressed is:  What impact will NAFTA have on environmental and
labor standards, and on environmental quality and working conditions on both sides of the
border?  This will largely depend on how certain "side-agreements," currently under negotiation,
are developed to confront the serious environmental and labor issues that NAFTA poses.  While
the shape of these side-agreements will ultimately determine the outcome, it is clear that without
them, NAFTA will face significant opposition.  And if NAFTA fails, not only will Minnesota (and
Mexico) sacrifice employment gains, it will be much less likely that Mexico will make progress on
environmental and labor issues.
The third issue is:  What are the risks of "import surges" under the current agreement,
especially for Minnesota's sugar producers, and can safeguards be developed which continue
to protect the sugar industry?  The sugar industry has warned of the possibility of import surges
due to technical production shifts combined with the dismantling of current border protection
which insulates U.S. sugar from Mexican competition.  This has resulted in discussions of a third
side-agreement to prevent such surges.
A final issue of relevance to Minnesota is:  What if NAFTA fails?  What opportunities and
advantages will be lost to Minnesota exporters and importers, and how might such failure relate
to Mexico's commitment to economic growth, environmental and labor standards, and
hemispheric stability and security?
These four issues form the basis of this brief report.  It is designed to help Minnesotans
form views and opinions about the basic impacts of NAFTA, and to advance the process of
discussion and debate.  Minnesota is heavily dependent on foreign trade especially in agriculture
and high technology, has strong environmental and labor standards, a major, efficient sugar
industry, and a citizenry largely sympathetic to economic development in developing countries
such as Mexico.  These characteristics make an accurate appraisal of NAFTA of considerable
importance to the state and its people.
C. Ford Runge
University of Minnesota     
2See, for example, Clyde Prestowitz, "Making the Free-Trade Agreement Work," and Harley
Shaiken, "Will Manufacturing Head South?" both in Technology Review, April 26, 1993, pp. 23-
31.
     
3D. K. Brown, A. V. Deardorff and R. H. Stern, "A North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Analytical Issues and a Computational Assessment."  University of Michigan.  Institute of Public
Policy Studies.  Discussion Paper 289.  October 18, 1991.  See Table 5.
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I.  WILL NAFTA COST MINNESOTA JOBS?
One of the most-debated issues surrounding NAFTA is its potential impact on employment. 
Critics of the agreement contend that it will cause U.S. jobs to migrate South, and that U.S.
workers will therefore lose employment opportunities to Mexico.  Often cited is the
"maquiladora" sector along the U.S.-Mexican border, where foreign-owned plants import raw
materials duty free, and exports are subjected to duties only on the added value.  This sector,
where many U.S. firms employ Mexican nationals, and where serious environmental problems are
evident (see Section II), is described by some as a scenario likely to characterize Mexico as a
whole if NAFTA becomes a reality.
2  In order to estimate NAFTA's employment impacts, a
survey was conducted of various econometric modelling efforts.  These studies forecast the likely
impacts of NAFTA on various sectors of the U.S. and Mexican economies.
Before looking specifically at Minnesota, four general findings are worthy of notice.  First,
because the U.S. economy is very large in comparison with Mexico's (U.S. national income is
roughly 25 times that of Mexico), the relative employment impact of tariff reductions on the U.S.
will be positive but small relative to Mexico.  One study conducted in 1991 at the University of
Michigan estimated that simple reduction in tariff and nontariff barriers under NAFTA would
increase Mexico's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1.6 percent, Canada's by 0.7 percent, and
U.S. GDP by one-tenth of one (0.1) percent.  If capital flows were liberalized too, the GDP
figures rise to 5.0 percent for Mexico, remain 0.7 percent for Canada, and go up to three-tenths
of one (0.3) percent for the U.S.
3
A second general finding is that NAFTA will contribute to a process of North American
trade growth that is already well underway.  When Mexico joined the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, it was obligated to reduce its general tariff from around 80
percent to about 50 percent.  Mexico went further, unilaterally reducing its average tariff to
between 10 and 20 percent.  In economic terms, NAFTA's added contribution to this process will
be positive but "at the margin."
Over 5, 10 or 15 years, many factors other than simple tariff reductions will affect U.S.-
Mexico and U.S.-Canada trade, notably the overall levels of growth in all three economies and the
continuation of market integration underway pre-NAFTA.  To the extent that Mexico grows
more rapidly and dynamically under NAFTA, its role as an importer of U.S. exports, and
generator of future U.S. jobs, will grow accordingly.  It is this general and dynamic growth in     
4Enrique G. Mendoza.  "Dynamic Gains from North American Free Trade in an Equilibrium
Model of the Current Account."  North American Journal of Economics and Finance 3:2(Fall,
1992): 141-161.
     
5Brown, et. al., 1991, op. cit. note 3, p. 11.  Some accounts of job "losses" to Mexico include
the decision of hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers to stay at home.  Counting this as a job
"loss" to the U.S. economy is a questionable assertion on both economic and policy grounds.
     
6U.S. Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration.  Statistical Abstract of the
United States.  Bureau of the Census.  Washington, DC, 1992.  Table 851.
4
trading activity, rather than the slice of trade affected by NAFTA-inspired tariff reductions, that
will largely determine overall job creation in North America.  A study conducted in the Research
Department of the International Monetary Fund estimated that such dynamic increases may lead
average levels of consumption to increase permanently in Mexico by as much as 500 percent, with
corresponding implications for U.S. exports.
4
A third general finding of econometric studies is that (in part because NAFTA's effects will
be marginal in the U.S. and more pronounced in Mexico), wage levels in Mexico are expected to
rise while those in the U.S. are barely (although positively) affected.  The University of Michigan
study cited above estimated that wage rates in Mexico would rise by 0.7 percent as tariffs and
nontariff barriers (NTBs) are removed and by 9.3 percent if tariffs, NTBs and capital flows were
liberalized, compared with a two-tenths of one percent (0.2) increase in the U.S.  The authors
conclude that the effect of such a narrowing in the wage gap will be to reduce the pressure for
illegal immigration.  In short, "the narrowing of the wage gap is not accomplished at the expense
of U.S. workers."
5
A fourth finding is that because the fastest growing source of jobs in the U.S. economy is
small business, the impacts of trade expansion with Mexico will be positively related to
employment growth not only in multinational companies doing business on both sides of the
border, but smaller firms doing export/import trade in the United States.  From 1988-1990, about
2.7 million jobs were created in the United States on net, resulting from total losses of 1.3 million
and total gains of 4.0 million jobs.  The jobs gained were overwhelmingly in firms of fewer than
500 employees, and most in firms of less than 20 employees.
6
What about employment impacts in Minnesota?  All four general trends are at work here. 
First, the Minnesota economy will be positively affected, although the employment effects will be
small.  Job growth in Minnesota during the last three years has been roughly 35,000 per year.  A
1992 study by the University of Michigan Institute of Public Policy Studies estimated that over
the first ten years of the agreement, total employment generation in Minnesota will be between     
7R. M. Stern, A. V. Deardorff and D. K. Brown.  "A U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade
Agreement:  Sectoral Employment Effects and Regional/Occupational Employment Realignment
in the United States."  Appendix A in U.S. Department of Labor, National Commission for
Employment Policy.  The Employment Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Recommendations and Background Studies.  Special Report No. 33.  Washington, D.C., October
1992.
     
8U.S. Department of Commerce.  Minneapolis District Office.  Ronald Kramer, Director. 
Correspondence.
     
9Duluth Area Chamber of Commerce.  Letter of March 23, 1993.  Signed David P. Cordeau.
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400 and 630 jobs.
7  This can be compared with 1992 trade-related employment in Minnesota
linked to Mexico of approximately 3,400 direct manufacturing jobs.
8  While hardly a boon to the
state, this finding does not support the dire warnings of those who claim that NAFTA will cost
Minnesota jobs.  Second, the impacts of NAFTA will be in addition to those that are already
underway due to increasing Minnesota-Mexico trade.  In recognition of these trends, the
International Business Committee of the Duluth Area Chamber of Commerce, for example,
recently passed a motion in strong support of NAFTA, citing exports from Minnesota up 141
percent since 1987, an average annual increase of 28 percent.
9  Third, the wage impacts of
NAFTA on Minnesota are likely to be consistent with those of the nation as a whole:  essentially
none.  Because of its modest effect on employment, NAFTA will neither depress nor elevate wage
levels in Minnesota.  Fourth, employment and trading opportunities from expanded trade with
Mexico will include not only large but many small and medium sized Minnesota firms.  In 1991
78.5 percent of Minnesota workers were employed in firms of less than 500 employees, and 51
percent were employed in firms of less than 100 employees.
Sectoral Impacts
Utilizing several models developed to estimate sectoral impacts of NAFTA, separate
assessments were made of the sectoral impacts of the agreement (and more general growth in
U.S.-Mexico trade) on (1) agriculture and (2) manufacturing and services in Minnesota.     
10Gary W. Williams and C. Parr Rosson, III.  "Agriculture and the North American Free Trade
Agreement."  Choices (Fourth Quarter 1992):  16-19.
     
11U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Minnesota Agricultural Statistics Service.  Minnesota
Agriculture Statistics 1992.  July 1992, p. 3.
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Agriculture
The agricultural sector (which also includes forestry and fisheries) accounts for a large
share of Minnesota's employment benefits from NAFTA (see Table 1).  Mexico is the third largest
agricultural trading partner of the U.S., purchasing food and fiber valued at 2.5 billion dollars in
1992, up 9 percent from 1990.
10  Growth in agricultural exports to Mexico under NAFTA will
occur in products where Minnesota has strong comparative advantages.  Because the agricultural
sector does not take on additional labor as rapidly as many others, such employment impacts tend
to underestimate farm income benefits that will accrue from increased trade to Minnesota family
farming operations, food and forest products exporters, and processors.
NAFTA will add to a process of Mexican tariff elimination in agriculture that is already
underway.  Mexico has unilaterally eliminated import licenses for many agricultural products, but
over 25 percent of all U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico are still subject to import licensing as
well as nontariff barriers such as trading regulations.  The remaining barriers will fall over 5, 10
and 15 year schedules, although tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) will be retained for some products.
The major beneficiaries will be Minnesota producers and exporters of the following
commodities:  corn, soybeans and other oilseeds such as sunflowers, wheat, pork, poultry and
beef, and dairy products such as cheese and butter.  In 1991, Minnesota ranked fourth in total
U.S. production of corn, third in soybeans, eleventh in wheat, third in sunflowers, third in hogs
marketed, second in turkey production, ninth in cattle and calves on feed, fifth in milk production,
third in total cheese production and fourth in butter.
11  
Despite particular concerns about more open trade in Minnesota's beleaguered dairy sector,
Mexico is a bright spot for dairy producers.  Mexico is the world's largest importer of dairy
products, and the largest dairy export customer of the U.S., accounting for almost half of U.S.
dairy exports since 1985.  Most of these exports consist of nonfat dry milk, and are government
to government sales used to provide subsidized milk to lower income Mexican families through
state-run distribution programs.  As incomes increase, this demand is likely to shift into higher
value-added cheeses, butter and other products such as yogurt and ice cream.  The main NAFTA
impact on U.S. dairy exports thus will occur indirectly through overall income growth in the
Mexican economy, rather than from tariffs eliminated under NAFTA itself.  In a recent evaluation
of NAFTA conducted by a task force of the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
(CAST) the following observation was made:
Mexico continues to have a high rate of population growth.  When the effects of     
12Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), "U.S. Agriculture and the North
American Trade Agreement."  Second Draft.  March 24, 1993, p. 16.
     
13E. Wesley F. Peterson.  University of Nebraska.  "U.S.-Mexico Free Trade:  Grains and
Oilseeds."  Leaflet No. 2.  Proceedings of an Agricultural Satellite Broadcast.  November 21,
1991.  Edited by Emily McClain.  Clemson University.  Southern Rural Development Center. 
Clemson, S.C.
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that growth in population are combined with the effects of increases in per capita
income on the order of 3 to 5 percent per year -- which are entirely feasible -- the
demand for food in the Mexican economy may well expand over the next decade at
rates of 4 to 6 percent a year.  Very few countries have been able to expand their
production of food at that rate on a sustained basis.  It is most unlikely that Mexico
will be able to do so.  Thus the import demand for food in Mexico is likely to be
strong at least into the next decade.
12
In the grains and oilseeds sector, estimates made at the University of Nebraska indicate that
if current trends continue through 1991-95, even without NAFTA, corn imports by Mexico will
rise by 26 percent; wheat imports by 25 percent; soybean imports by 8 percent; and total grain
imports (including rice and sorghum) will rise by 18 percent.  Under a NAFTA scenario of partial
liberalization, the figures rise to 44 percent for corn, 59 percent for wheat, 14 percent for
soybeans, and 39 percent for total grains.  If full liberalization is achieved consequent to NAFTA,
the figures rise to 73 percent for corn, 75 percent for wheat, 21 percent for soybeans, and 63
percent for total grains.  The Nebraska study concludes by noting that these relatively short-term
effects do not include the "economic stimulus and income growth that would probably be
associated with a NAFTA," which "could lead to even greater increases in U.S. grain and oilseed
exports."
13
In the livestock sector, the U.S. mainly exports livestock products to Mexico, and imports
live animals, making our trade highly complementary.  Overall, Mexico is the second largest U.S.
export market, after Japan, for meat and meat products.  In 1990, Mexico accounted for about 10
percent of total U.S. livestock exports (valued at 6.6 billion dollars) and about 8 percent of U.S.
livestock imports (valued at 5.5 billion dollars).  Mexico is the fourth largest U.S. beef market,
after Japan, Canada and South Korea.  Mexico accounts for nearly all (95 percent) of U.S. feeder
cattle imports.     
14Williams and Rosson, op. cit. note 9, 1992.
     
15U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Economic Research Service.  Foreign Agricultural Trade
of the U.S.  Calendar Year 1991 Supplement.  Washington, D.C. July, 1992.  p. 114.
     
16Eduardo Segarra.  Texas Tech University.  "U.S.-Mexico Free Trade:  Livestock Products." 
Leaflet No. 3.  Proceedings of an Agricultural Satellite Broadcast.  November 21, 1991.  Edited
by Emily McClain.  Clemson University.  Southern Rural Development Center.  Clemson, S.C.
     
17U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Minnesota Agricultural Statistics Service.  Minnesota
Agricultural Statistics 1992.  July, 1992.  p. 23.
     
18U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Economic Research Service.  Foreign Agricultural Trade
of the U.S.  Calendar Year 1991 Supplement.  Washington, DC, July, 1992.  pp. 262; 421.
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Because of lower feeding costs and transport infrastructure, lowering tariff and nontariff
barriers and raised sanitary standards due to NAFTA are expected to give short-run advantages to
U.S. exports of live animals to Mexico, as well as low cost processed meats, edible offals, and
high quality beef and pork.  As in the dairy sector, higher incomes in Mexico are likely to produce
additional demands for high quality meat products.
14  In the turkey market, for example, which
Minnesota dominates together with North Carolina, in 1991 29,000 metric tons of fresh or frozen
turkey was exported to Mexico, up from 7,100 in 1990, accounting for 62 percent of total U.S.
exports of nearly 47,000 metric tons.
15  In contrast, increased Mexican livestock and poultry
products exports to the U.S. are unlikely to occur, although export-oriented cattle and hog
feeding will probably grow.
16
A final and important issue concerns Minnesota's sugar industry.  While this issue will be
discussed in detail in Part III under "Import Surges," it is important to note that Minnesota is a
major producer of sugar beets, ranking first among the states in 1991, with 6.17 million tons.
17  It
is also a relatively low-cost producing area, which will remain competitive compared with other
U.S. producing regions.  Substantial capital and employment is tied up in sugar processing in the
Red River Valley and Renville area, making it an important part of Minnesota's agricultural
employment base.
Currently, Mexican sugar consumption outpaces production, ranking among the highest
levels in the world, at 102 pounds per capita.  Population growth and economic recovery have
shifted Mexico from net exporter to major net importer status, with a large share of imports
coming from the U.S. as refined sugar under the U.S. re-export program, which allows U.S.
refiners to import world market sugar and re-export the refined product.  Total U.S. sugar
exports to Mexico (including both beet and cane) were 219,000 metric tons in 1991, 38 percent
of total U.S. exports.  Total U.S. imports from Mexico were 7,800 metric tons, less than one
percent of total U.S. imports of 1.613 million tons, which are restricted under tariff rate quotas.
18     
19"USDA Weighs Imposing Quotas on American Sugar Production."  Journal of Commerce. 
April 12, 1993, p. 7A.
     
20American Farm Bureau Federation.  Study Tour of the Mexican Sugar Industry.  November
15-20, 1992.  p. 6.
     
21U.S. Department of Commerce and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, MISER.
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The concern of the U.S. sugar industry is that new investment in Mexican sugar production,
together with imports of high-fructose-corn-syrup (HFCS) for use in food processing (especially
soft-drinks), will free up sugar for export to the United States.  It is held that U.S. producers will
be inadequately protected under NAFTA from such import surges if and when Mexico reverts to
net exporter status because of provisions granting market access for sugar to the U.S. after six
years.  These fears are reinforced by excess production of sugar in the U.S. in response to
government subsidies.  In the 1993 crop year, beginning October 1, 1992, sugar beet production
is up 12 percent.
19  This is the reason that the sugar industry has requested an additional side
agreement to safeguard it from such surges (see Part III).  While such surges are hypothetically
possible, a study tour conducted by the American Farm Bureau concluded that "Scenarios can be
developed in which Mexico has sizeable exports, but there are equally plausible scenarios that
leave Mexico a major net importer of sugar."
20
Manufacturing and Services
Minnesota's manufacturing sector has increased exports to Mexico from 3.8 million dollars
to 5.9 million dollars from 1987-1991, or by 55 percent.  The most recent calculations of the
Minnesota Trade Office based on U.S. Department of Commerce data, show Mexico accounting
in 1991 for 3.52 percent of total Minnesota manufactured exports, ranking seventh overall.
21  The
leading export industries in the sector (and their share of the total for the same period) were
industrial machinery (37.9 percent), scientific instruments (15.1 percent), electrical equipment
(10.8 percent), transportation equipment (8.8 percent), and food and kindred products (5.2
percent).  Of these, the most rapid growth in percentage terms occurred in scientific instruments
(32.2 percent); followed by transportation equipment (23.2 percent) and electrical equipment
(21.4 percent).
Given this rapid growth in exports pre-NAFTA, NAFTA itself will increase demand at the
margin, producing a small gain in Minnesota employment.  In the first ten years, the 1992
University of Michigan study estimates a net increase in employment in Minnesota between
roughly 400 and 630 jobs, of which a large share occur in agriculture, the rest in manufacturing,
with minimal but modestly negative impacts on services.  These estimates are based on four
different scenarios increasing from simple tariff elimination to tariff and quota elimination plus 10
percent increases in capital flows (see Table 1).  The highest estimates of job creation are roughly
twice those of the U.S.-Canada agreement, but are still small.     
22DRI/McGraw-Hill, Lexington, Massachusetts.  "The Impact of the North American Free
Trade Agreement on U.S. Regional and Sectoral Labor Markets."  Appendix B in National
Commission for Employment Policy.  U.S. Department of Labor.  The Employment Effects of the
North American Free Trade Agreement:  Recommendations and Background Studies. 
Washington, D.C.  October, 1992.
     
23U.S. Department of Labor.  Industrial Effects of a Free Trade Agreement Between Mexico
and the USA.  Washington, D.C.  September, 1990.
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When manufacturing and service jobs are separated from agriculture (shown as ISIC
category 1 in Table 1) the major gains come in nonelectrical machinery and miscellaneous
manufactures, with some losses indicated in electrical machinery, transport equipment, and mining
and quarrying.  Impacts on the services sector are relatively small.  When employment is broken
down into occupational categories (Table 2), agriculture, forestry and fishing again account for
the bulk of jobs, with the remainder distributed across other professional categories.  The same
modest losses (a total of 22 jobs) in services and precision production are shown.  Table 3 shows
the same results, but compares Minnesota to the rest of the West North Central States.  The
relative employment gains in Minnesota are greater, and losses fewer, than in the rest of the
region.  
It may be useful to compare these results to other econometric studies.  Data Resources
Incorporated/McGraw Hill of Lexington, Massachusetts also estimated employment effects by
sector, comparing the gradual implementation of NAFTA for the West North Central States to
the year 2000 against a baseline of current U.S.-Mexico trade (Tables 4, 5, and 6).  While only
regional figures were reported, the 1992 study found benefits widely distributed by category, with
modest losses concentrated in a few, mainly non-traded sectors.
22
A third study, conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1990, compared Minnesota's
base employment to the year 2000 with a NAFTA limited to tariff elimination and a wider
liberalization including tariffs and other trade barriers (Table 7).  The overall results showed
increases in state employment from 2,593 to 3,457 jobs.
23
In summary, where specific estimates of employment effects for Minnesota are available,
the overall impact on manufacturing and services is small but positive.  These sectoral impacts are
distributed widely, amounting to a few hundred jobs here and there, with total impacts ranging
from the hundreds to several thousand.  These estimates do not account for dynamic growth
effects, which could multiply the impact of NAFTA.  In these sectors, as in agriculture, the overall
employment impacts of NAFTA appear modestly positive.     
24A maquiladora is a foreign-owned plant in Mexico subject to duty free import of raw
materials, in which finished products are exported duty free except for value added in Mexico. 
See Malissa H. McKeith, "The Environment and Free Trade:  Meeting Halfway at the Mexican
Border."  Pacific Basin Law Journal 10:1(1991): 183-211.
     
25Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative.  Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Finance.  Hearing, September 8, 1992.  
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II.  ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR STANDARDS
Environmental Standards
One of the central issues surrounding NAFTA is the impact of expanded trade on the
environment.  It is for this reason that a NAFTA "side-agreement" on the environment is now
under negotiation.  The salience of the environmental issue is due in part to the major
environmental problems of the border region pre-NAFTA, when the "maquiladora" sector
24
became the focus of widespread criticism because of the absence of enforced environmental
regulations.  Unless NAFTA is accompanied by environmental safeguards, it is widely felt that it
might add to Mexico's environmental problems.  Because the environmental damages could cross
the borders of the agreement's signatories, the appropriate regulatory response appears to be not
only enforced regulations in the home markets of the three nations, but trilateral instruments
responsive to the transnational problems involved.
Despite parallel Canadian concerns, the majority of attention in environmental circles has
been on the wide gaps in enforced regulations between the U.S. and Mexico.  In response to
criticism, the Bush administration and Mexican government included provisions in NAFTA
designed to encourage higher Mexican environmental standards and compliance.  Former U.S.
Trade Representative Carla Hills stated that NAFTA "goes further than any previous trade
agreement in addressing environmental concerns and actively promoting environmental
protection."
25  Yet environmentalists have called for more and stricter environmental regulations
as part of a final NAFTA package.
Most of the criticisms of NAFTA on environmental grounds project that it will make
existing environmental problems worse.  Yet without NAFTA, it is doubtful that these problems
would have received the attention they have, or that Mexico and the U.S. would have committed
themselves to environmental improvements.  In this sense, while NAFTA may lead to trade
patterns with negative environmental effects, it also has created an opportunity to address these
effects more openly than ever before.  And if it succeeds in generating economic and income
growth of the sort projected, especially in Mexico, it can help create the wherewithal to expand
remedial environmental efforts.  It is noteworthy that one of the sectors in which small Minnesota
companies are leading global competitors is in environmental technologies, such as wastewater
treatment.  To the extent that an environmental side-agreement to NAFTA encourages further     
26Michael Scott Feeley, and Elizabeth Knier, "Environmental Considerations of the Emerging
United States - Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2" Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law 259, 276 (1992) cited in David Voigt, "The Maquiladora Problem in the age of
NAFTA:  Where Will We Find Solutions?", Minnesota Journal of Global Trade Vol. 2, Issue 2
(forthcoming).
     
27"Crowded Border Imports High Rate of Disease:  Maquilas Bring Workers, But Sewage,
Health Systems Aren't Ready," El Paso Times, May 14, 1991, p. 1A.
     
28Ibid., p. 35.
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diffusion of these technologies, Minnesota will be a beneficiary.  Ironically, if NAFTA is defeated
(on environmental or other grounds), a major opportunity for environmental improvements may
have been lost.  Environmental opponents of NAFTA, if they persist in urging its defeat rather
than marshalling support for additional safeguards, will thus lose an important lever for change.
Change is clearly necessary.  Existing environmental problems in the border region are
especially grave in the maquiladora industries.  As these industries have expanded, uncontrolled
industrial growth, undeveloped infrastructure to deal with industrial, municipal and animal wastes,
and a lack of enforced environmental regulations have resulted in an "environmental disaster
zone."
26  Even the conservative American Medical Association called the U.S.-Mexico border a
"breeding ground for infectious disease" in a report in June, 1990.
27  Factories in Mexico which
operate under the maquiladora program have been major contributors to the pollution problem. 
In response to a question posed in a survey of maquiladora plants about the typical technology
used to treat industrial wastes, 54 percent stated they used Mexican standards, 29 percent used
U.S. standards and 17 percent used best available technology.
28  The essential question is whether
the maquiladora sector is an indicator of future development under NAFTA, or will be taken as a
warning of what happens when trade is left to expand without accompanying environmental
regulation and remediation.
In addition to concerns of a Mexican pollution haven and the maquiladora pollution
problem, other environmental issues have arisen as NAFTA was negotiated.  These include
pesticide residues on imported crops and increased levels of air pollution and more toxic spills due
to higher levels of traffic.  Pesticide standards are a major issue for American consumers.  A
significant gap exists between U.S. and Mexican pesticide standards both in legalized pesticide
use and in levels of pesticide applications.  If pesticide applications in Mexico result in local
environmental damage such as groundwater contamination, these damages are largely local.  But
when pesticides are applied to crops which are exported and the exported crops contain harmful
pesticide residues, a transnational problem arises.   Whether such problems can be confronted
effectively through harmonization of standards, or whether the U.S. should restrict market access
to these products, will remain an important issue in relation to the environmental side-agreement.
Concern has also arisen about the environmental effects of higher levels of traffic resulting     
29Among the specific proposals advanced were, inter alia, Stewart J. Hudson and Rodrigo J.
Prudencio (for the National Wildlife Federation), "The North American Commission on
Environment and Other Supplemental Environmental Agreements:  Part Two of the NAFTA
Package."  February 4, 1993.  Justin Ward (for the Natural Resources Defense Council),
"Environmental Elements of the NAFTA Package:  Testimony of the Natural Resources Defense
Council Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate."  March 16,
1993.  J. Michael McCloskey and John Audley (for the Sierra Club), "Environmental Concerns
Regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement."  February, 1993.  See also Steve
Charnovitz, "NAFTA:  An Analysis of its Environmental Provisions."  Environmental Law
Reporter.  News and Analysis 23 ELR 10067-10073.
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from NAFTA, especially in the U.S.-Mexico border region.  The standards for vehicle smog
emissions are lower in Mexico than in the U.S.  In addition, truck traffic, which has increased in
recent years as trade between the U.S. and Mexico has grown, is expected to increase further
after NAFTA is enacted.  If the pollution generated by traffic between the U.S., Mexico and
Canada affects all three nations by contributing to poor air quality, an additional reason exists for
a trilateral response.
These issues, together with a desire to promote trade through NAFTA, led the Clinton
administration to trilateral negotiations beginning in March, 1993 on an environmental side-
agreement to the NAFTA text.  These negotiations are driven by the following logic.  First,
NAFTA as a trade measure could lead to environmental damages, or at a minimum might
aggravate existing environmental conditions, notably in the maquiladora sector and border region. 
Second, remediating these damages requires some regulating mechanism to enforce environmental
safeguards.  Third, since the environmental problems include not only local but transnational
problems, a coordinated trilateral response is required involving new institutional authority.  
This new authority was proposed in the form of a trilateral North American Commission on
the Environment (NACE).  A variety of responsibilities for the NACE have been proposed by
environmental groups.
29  The NACE would monitor the implementation of the environmental
provisions of NAFTA, and provide information on compliance with domestic laws in all three
countries, reviewing and recommending on a regular basis improvements in compliance and
enforcement.  In addition, by promoting cooperative trilateral environmental actions, including
raising and harmonizing environmental standards, NACE would help reduce incentives for
pollution havens and the use of different standards.  The effectiveness of the NACE would depend
on its degree of true oversight authority, and its ability to influence the flow of funds for trilateral
environmental actions.
On May 4, 1993, a coalition of seven national environmental interest groups announced
provisional support for NAFTA, if a satisfactory environmental side-agreement containing the
NACE could be successfully negotiated.  The group included the World Wildlife Fund, the
National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund,     
30"Environmental Organizations Outline Proposal for NAFTA Side-Agreements."  Press
Release.  May 4, 1993.  Contact Justin Ward, Natural Resources Defense Council (202) 783-
7800.
     
31Peter M. Emerson, letter to the editor, The New York Times, "Making Trade Pact Work for
the Environment," March 30, 1993, p. A14.  See also "Testimony of Dr. Peter M. Emerson,
Senior Economist, Environmental Defense Fund, before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee
on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives," Washington, DC, March 11, 1993.
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the Nature Conservancy, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Natural Resources Defense Council.
30
In sum, improving environmental safeguards seems not only compatible with a NAFTA
treaty, but probably depends on it.  As Peter Emerson of the Austin office of the Environmental
Defense Fund noted recently:
On the environment, it would make more sense to push all three countries to
recognize a convergence of interest in solving joint problems. Motives that brought
them to the bargaining table for freer trade in goods, services and capital across
national boundaries should be used to reduce the unintended trade in environmental
degradation.  This means working together to set priorities, finding the means to
enforce laws and international agreements on the books, and creating incentives and
institutions that benefit the environment.
31     
32Harley Shaiken.  "Will Manufacturing Head South?"  Technology Review.  April 24, 1993. 
pp. 28-29.
     
33CAST, op. cit. note 11, 1993, p. 18.
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Labor Standards
Labor standards are the subject of the second "side-agreement" negotiations.  Organized
labor has maintained that NAFTA will create incentives for manufacturing to move where wages
are lower.  An example often cited is the decision of Smith-Corona to move operations to
Tijuana, from its plants in Cortland, New York.  As one labor analyst argued, "Mexico's low
wages could add to the significant downward pressure on U.S. wages already occurring as the
United States integrates further into the global economy."
32  In addition to the wage issue, many
are concerned that lower levels of enforced occupational, health and safety standards in Mexico
will draw investment away from the United States, analogous to the "pollution havens" discussed
above.
Like environmental issues, the labor side-agreement has come to the fore largely because of
the NAFTA discussions.  Smith Corona's move preceded, and was not caused by, NAFTA.  In
this respect, those advocating improvements in both labor and environmental standards are
divided into two groups.  One group seeks actual improvements through negotiated side
agreements which they insist accompany the NAFTA treaty text.  The other group supports side-
agreements only in the hope that they will lead to an overall defeat of the treaty package.  Yet if
NAFTA is defeated, it will not prevent firms from relocating to Mexico, nor will the Mexican
government have the same incentives to raise labor standards.
The results of the 1991 University of Michigan study noted above suggest that rather than
creating additional downward pressure on U.S. wages, the primary impact of NAFTA will be to
raise Mexican wages, perhaps by as much as 9 percent, without lowering those in the U.S.  And
the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology analysis of NAFTA noted:
The fact that labor in Mexico tends to receive a lower wage rate than does labor
in the United States does not mean it is "cheap" labor.  Moreover, the issue is not the
difference in wage rates per se between the two countries, but rather the difference in
the cost of labor that matters; low-wage labor need not necessarily be low-cost labor. 
In fact, low-wage labor may well be high-cost labor.  It all depends on the
productivity of that labor.  High-wage labor, as we tend to have in the United States,
can well be low-cost labor if its productivity is high enough.
33
With respect to labor standards, a labor side-agreement, like its environmental counterpart,
can help to raise occupational, health and safety standards to U.S. levels, and compel U.S. firms
to adopt similar standards in both countries.  But neither process is likely without the     
34Stern, et al., op. cit note 7, 1992, p. iii.
     
35DRI/McGraw-Hill, op. cit. note 21, 1992.
     
36P. L. Martin.  "NAFTA, Migration, and U.S. Labor Markets."  Appendix C in U.S.
Department of Labor.  National Commission for Employment Policy.  The Employment Effects of
the North American Free Trade Agreement:  Recommendation and Background Studies.  Special
Report No. 33.  Washington, D.C.  October, 1992.
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opportunities and incentives created by NAFTA.
In a series of studies undertaken by the National Commission for Employment Policy of the
U.S. Department of Labor, the slight impact of NAFTA on U.S. labor markets was documented. 
The 1992 University of Michigan study concluded that "the worker dislocation associated with
NAFTA appears to be very small in comparison to the U.S. labor force and in comparison to the
sectoral/regional/state employment levels.  This is even more the case when the labor-market
dislocation effects are expressed in annual terms to take into account the fact that a NAFTA
would be phased in over a period of a decade or maybe even longer."
34
A second study, the Data Resources Incorporated/McGraw-Hill analysis noted above,
concluded that the region of which Minnesota is a part will be relatively unaffected in employment
terms by NAFTA, with Minnesota actually positioned more favorably than the rest of the region.
35
A third study, analyzing NAFTA's impact on migration patterns, concluded that increased
Mexico-U.S. migration due to NAFTA should be limited to 100,000 migrants annually, of which
perhaps 10,000 might settle.  This compares to estimates of from 4 to 5 million in legal and illegal
migration in the 1990s.
36     
37Current program-supported domestic price levels average about 21 cents per pound for raw
cane sugar.  World prices average 9-12 cents.  See Robert Barry, "The U.S. and World Sugar
Markets in Transition."  Paper presented at Fifth Annual Agribusiness Outlook Forum.  Piper,
Jaffray and Hopwood:  New York City, NY.  January 23, 1991.
     
38"NAFTA:  The Sugar provision and its potential effects.  AgWeek.  Grand Forks, ND. 
March 8, 1993.  p. 15.
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III.  "IMPORT SURGES"
The third side-agreement under discussion revolves around possible increases in imports
from Mexico in commodities currently protected at the border.  The most important is sugar, as
noted in the discussion of Minnesota agriculture above.  The U.S. sugar program is based on
prices to domestic growers of beet and cane sugar supported at 200-400 percent of world market
levels.  In order to maintain these artificial domestic price levels, foreign imports of sugar are
restricted through border measures called tariff rate quotas (TRQs), a two-tier tariff instrument. 
The first tier is a low tariff for imports up to a specified quantity.  The second tier is a high tariff
on additional imports:  16 cents a pound.
37
Because the domestic market for U.S. sugar depends on these TRQs for its existence, any
additional market access granted to low-cost sugar from tropical cane in the Caribbean, including
Mexico, is a concern.  The NAFTA provides that if in any of the first six years of the agreement,
Mexico is projected to be a surplus producer, its duty-free access will increase to 25,000 metric
tons, from its current TRQ of roughly 7,200.  The U.S. second tier tariff (16 cents) also will drop
15 percent to 13.6 cents from year 1-6.  In years 7-15, the 13.6 cent tariff will be reduced to zero
and a common U.S.-Mexico tariff will prevail against the rest of the world.  Throughout the 15-
year period, if Mexico fails to achieve surpluses for two consecutive years, its market access can
increase to 150,000 metric tons in year 7, and 10 percent a year to as much as 322,000 tons in
year 15.  On the other hand, if Mexico is in surplus for two consecutive years, it may export its
entire surplus to the U.S.  After year 15, Mexican exports to the U.S. will face no restrictions. 
Sugar producers contend that this widening "window" gives Mexico considerable incentives to
shift from net importer to net exporter status, especially if the Mexican soft-drink industry shifts
to high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS).
38
The study tour of the Mexican sugar industry conducted by the American Farm Bureau
Federation maintained that seven conditions will be necessary for Mexico to achieve net exporter
status:
1. There must be a significant quantity of sugar displaced by HFCS.
2. There must be a favorable price for sugarcane relative to other crops.
3. The move must continue toward little or no government interference in the sugar     
39American Farm Bureau Federation.  Study Tour of the Mexican Sugar Industry.  November
15-20, 1992.  p. 6.
18
industry's privatization.
4. There must be greater efforts by government and industry to direct research and
development funding into sugar production.
5. Transportation and infrastructure problems must be solved.
6. Privatization of property and/or changes in the land tenure system must be achieved.
7. An environment conducive to investment must be maintained.
39
Depending on the likelihood attached to these conditions, the side-agreement negotiations on
import surges will seek mechanisms to safeguard domestic U.S. sugar support prices.  These
include (a) the inclusion of HFCS in the 15-year transition calculations; (b) limiting market access
after 6 years; (c) adjusting TRQs to other nations to compensate for Mexican imports; and (d)
adjusting other border measures operating outside of NAFTA.  As noted above, Minnesota's
sugar producers are relatively low-cost and will remain competitive with other U.S. producers
under any scenario.     
40U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Economic Research Service.  World Agriculture Trends
and Indicators 1961-89.  Washington, D.C. 1991.
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IV.  WHAT IF NAFTA FAILS?
Much of the debate over NAFTA focuses on the impacts if it passes (with or without  side-
agreements).  Relatively little attention has been given to the opposite question:  What if NAFTA
fails?  From the analysis above, four possible impacts deserve careful consideration.
First, because the impacts of NAFTA are proportionately much greater for Mexico than for
the U.S. and Minnesota, failure will also bear much more heavily on the Mexican economy and
people.  While modest job opportunities for Minnesota will be lost, the employment impacts in
Mexico will be far more profound.  The government of Mexico has, in effect, staked its future
economic vitality on NAFTA.  The immediate consequence of its failure will be to derail a process
of market-oriented reforms begun in the 1980s, and to discredit export-oriented strategies which
depend on greater market access between the U.S. and Mexico.  Other Latin American countries
are watching the NAFTA process closely, and at least three (Argentina, Chile and Venezuela) are
actively pursuing membership in an expanded NAFTA trading area.  
The consequences of failure will be counterproductive not only for future economic growth
and development in Mexico, but in Latin America generally.  Latin America is one of the fastest
growing markets for U.S. exports.  Together, U.S. exports to Argentina, Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela grew by an average of 49 percent between 1985 and 1988.
40  Defeating NAFTA would
discourage this process of expansion, lowering standards of living in Latin America and
dampening exports to one of the most promising markets for U.S. exporters in the world.  In sum,
the intermediate term job losses from a defeat of NAFTA  are likely to considerably exceed those
associated with its passage.
Second, these job and income losses will contribute to greater political and economic
instability in Mexico and Latin America, which will in turn provoke additional illegal migration of
Mexican and Latin workers to U.S. markets.  Half of Mexico's population is under 20 years of
age; their future and NAFTA are closely linked.  A defeat for NAFTA could cause the U.S. will
lose in two ways.  Greater political and economic instability in Latin America may lead to
unwanted U.S. commitments to restore order, a tradition unpopular at home and reminiscent of
"Yankee imperialism" in Latin America.  In response, some Latins are likely to seek political or
economic refuge north of the border, leading to additional displacement of U.S. workers and
strains on government and social services.  Others will remain to foment further political upheaval
and to radicalize Latin American politics, armed with new evidence.
Third, NAFTA failure will almost certainly end U.S. interest in environmental problems in
Mexico; even if an interest persists, both the leverage and the wherewithal to confront these
problems will have been lost.  NAFTA has been a key in motivating the Mexican government to20
upgrade its environmental standards; the North American Commission on the Environment
(NACE) is one of the most exciting transnational efforts to deal with environmental problems in
history.  NAFTA's defeat will probably spell the end of such efforts, and the maquiladora sector
will remain the environmental trouble spot that it is today.  
Fourth, labor standards are unlikely to be addressed either; since wages in Mexico will
remain depressed, the incentive to move factories south to Mexico will continue and could even
accelerate, since the narrowing of the wage gap predicted under NAFTA will not occur.
Given these consequences of failure, prudence suggests a careful evaluation of the foregone
benefits and additional costs of defeating NAFTA, especially if a set of side agreements providing
appropriate safeguards can be negotiated.21
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to respond to four key questions surrounding the debate over
NAFTA and its impact on Minnesota.  The first question concerns its employment impacts:  Will
NAFTA cost jobs in Minnesota?  The answer appears to be no.  The magnitude of employment
impacts from NAFTA is small but positive.  Many of the gains will be in Minnesota agriculture
with some widely distributed benefits in manufacturing and no effect on services employment.  If
the effect of NAFTA is to lead Mexico into a period of higher sustained growth, the dynamic
process of income generation that results could boost demand for trade with Minnesota to levels
higher than predicted, with accompanying increases in employment.  But taking the most
conservative predictions, a range of estimates resulting from various econometric studies suggests
job creation from NAFTA over the next decade in Minnesota is likely to be from 400 to 3,500
jobs.
The second question concerns the "side-agreements" under discussion on environmental
and labor standards.  These are important issues for Minnesotans, and the success of the
negotiating process in this area will be key to a final NAFTA package.  The North American
Commission on the Environment (NACE), and proposals to upgrade labor standards in Mexico,
are important steps in the process of integrating the Mexican, U.S. and Canadian economies.  It is
important to keep in mind that without NAFTA, those issues would not have come to the fore.  If
NAFTA is defeated, so will be much of the associated effort to raise environmental and labor
standards.  It is also important to distinguish those who advocate side-agreements because they
believe that they must accompany trade liberalization, from those who would use them to defeat a
trade agreement, thus defeating their ostensible environmental and labor goals.  Most of the major
national environmental interest groups have now announced provisional support for NAFTA, if a
satisfactory side-agreement and NACE can be negotiated.
A third question concerns the side-agreement discussions over import surges, especially in
sugar.  There is evidence to support the possibility of such surges; there is also evidence which
casts doubt on this possibility.  It would appear that safeguards can be found to prevent such
surges, in the event that they materialize, without sacrificing the entire NAFTA agreement.
A final question is:  What if NAFTA  fails?  Failure will hurt Mexico's growth prospects far
more than those of the U.S. or Minnesota; yet in a larger sense, it may also bring additional and as
yet uncalculated costs.  Among them is a probable slowdown in the process of economic reforms
and growth in Latin America generally, which has been a rapidly growing market for U.S.
exporters.  Political and economic stagnation in Latin America has traditionally been associated
with higher rates of illegal migration and growing political instability, which have imposed costs
on U.S. taxpayers for both domestic and foreign programs of intervention.  Finally, as noted
above, failure would probably end the attention currently given to badly needed reforms in the
environmental and labor areas.
For these reasons, the NAFTA "package," including the side-agreements discussed above,
is more attractive than the alternative of a failed agreement.